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In an age of expansive genomic medicine, the findings of genetic se-
quencing techniques (whole genome/exome/mtDNA) are increas-
ingly being factored into decisions about the treatment of critically 
ill neonates. Yet, such decisions remain highly ethically fraught.1 
Neonatologists are generally familiar with the ethical complexity 
of such decisions and the value judgements about ‘worthwhile life’ 
inherent within them. However, they are far less exposed to the 
views and life experiences of adults and families who currently 
live with the genetic conditions, seen in neonatal intensive care, 
albeit in milder forms (eg, SMA types II- IV). The insights of this 
group have much to offer an understanding of ‘worthwhile life’ in 
the context of treatment (and non-treatment) of critically ill babies, 
yet their voices are seldom heard within these debates. This paper 
highlights how these views can be illuminating for neonatologists 
by drawing on a recent research study with adults living with a 
range of genetic conditions.2
Adults living with a variety of genetic conditions in the UK (in-
cluding Spinal Muscular Atrophy, Haemophilia, Thalassaemia, Fragile 
X Syndrome and Cystic Fibrosis), as well as their family members, 
were recently included in a large research project exploring atti-
tudes towards population-wide genetic screening programmes.2 
The resulting interviews (n = 130) and surveys (n = 1500) explored 
perspectives on ‘worthwhile life’; how the availability of genetic 
screening might have influenced their own reproductive decisions, 
and ultimately whether they would want to see the eradication of 
their condition through genomic interventions.
The data emerging from this study has produced a rich and varied 
picture of the views of this heterogeneous group. Overwhelmingly, 
the theme of ambivalence has characterised their responses to 
genomic medicine and the futures for reproduction and genetic 
disease suggested by it. This ambivalence stems, in a large part, from 
the lived realities of these conditions.
Participants across all condition groups drew attention to the 
plethora of factors that contributed to their daily lives, the most sig-
nificant of which typically had little to do with the genetic condition 
itself, but instead, the social and environmental conditions through 
which it was experienced.3 Social stigma, lack of adapted environ-
ments and the unavailability of financial/practical support, for exam-
ple, all emerged as factors that could be as detrimental to life quality 
as the condition. Furthermore, the study found little evidence of the 
assumed inverse relationship between phenotype severity and poor 
life quality. Adults with type II SMA, for example, overwhelmingly 
reported more positive life experiences than their counterparts with 
clinically less severe forms of the condition (types III and IV). Alex, an 
adult with type II SMA reflected on her own, and her sister, Penny's, 
response to life with SMA (Penny was diagnosed with type III SMA) 
when she commented;
Everyone expects me to be the bitter one because I'm 
type II and she's type III. I've never been able to walk, 
yet she has. But she's the one who hates having SMA 
… she's had to watch herself decline, whereas I never 
had it in the first place. We have completely different 
outlooks. 
(Alex, 22, SMA type II)
Identity politics played a significant role in this finding; participants 
with early onset conditions were more likely to view their condition 
as part of their personal identity and to have set their lives up around 
its existence than those with later onset/degenerative conditions. 
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However, this is not to say that physical suffering did not also feature 
in these families' accounts. Conditions that were significantly life-re-
ducing, degenerative and/or that involved periods of illness, pain and/
or hospitalisation were notably mentioned as features that dramati-
cally and negatively impacted ‘worthwhile’ life. However, it is to say 
that these participants nevertheless still situated this suffering within 
a much wider social and experiential context.4
For neonatologists who must make judgements about anticipated 
life quality for critically ill neonates, this social and personal framing 
is largely elusive. Their judgements must instead be grounded solely 
in the pheno- and genotype presentation of the infant, reducing 
their transferability to the lived experiences of adults with genetic 
disabilities reported here. This reductivism, however, also leaves 
their judgements more vulnerable to what has been termed the ‘ex-
pressivist critique’, a notion that has impacts extending beyond neo-
natal intensive care.
The ‘expressivist critique’ is an idea that was originally developed 
by disability rights supporters in response to prenatal testing and 
selective termination.5 The argument follows that to selectively ter-
minate a pregnancy based on a genetic trait is to express not only 
a negative valuation of that trait, but also the lives of people living 
with that trait. When applied to neonatology, expressivist objections 
would follow that a decision to allow an infant to die communicates 
an unequivocal negative appraisal of the value and quality of that 
child's life, which could logically be extended to the lives of others 
who share its condition.
Whilst widely cited, however, it is important to note that the ex-
pressivist critique has not been universally accepted, being viewed 
critically from both within and without the disability rights commu-
nity. Commentators argue, for example, that it should not be con-
sidered a contradiction to both terminate a pregnancy affected by a 
genetic condition (eg, due to inadequate resources to care for a child 
with high support needs) whilst simultaneously upholding the value 
of people with those needs.6 However, with neonatology decisions 
being so tightly focused on the clinical implications of the condition, 
devoid of the wider contextual and interpersonal factors that are a 
feature of termination decisions, this defence becomes harder to 
sustain.
Whether or not the theoretical robustness of the expressivist cri-
tique is accepted, however, is, in many ways, irrelevant. There is clear 
evidence that it is perceived as relevant to, and has significant impacts 
on, the lives of many people who live with genetic disease.7 One partic-
ipant with SMA, for example, reflected on the highly publicised 2006 
‘baby MB’ case (an infant with SMA whose doctors wanted to with-
draw life-sustaining treatment) when she commented;
Every time an SMA baby is aborted or allowed to die, 
it sends a message to all of us that society thinks it 
would have been better had we not existed at all. 
(Rosie, 32, SMA Type II)
Rosie's view highlights the way in which her identification with 
baby MB, who shared her condition, had impacts that stretched 
beyond the intensive care unit. The doctors' desire to withdraw treat-
ment from baby MB was interpreted by Rosie as a public, and damning, 
social commentary on the value of life with SMA. This view came to 
be highlighted by the media as one shared by other people with SMA.8 
Indeed, the implicit association between ‘disability’ and ‘suffering’ that 
is underscored by these types of decisions is one that the disability 
rights movement has worked hard to resist. Social model of disability 
theorists, for example, argues that the amalgamation of disability and 
suffering detracts focus from the social and environmental factors that 
create, or at least contribute to, disability, by instead foregrounding in-
dividuals with medical conditions as the real ‘problems’.9 At a point in 
time where debates about the treatment of critically ill neonates are 
increasingly moving into the public sphere, facilitated by the prolifer-
ation of social media, the ramifications of these decisions for disabled 
people appear set to only become more widespread in the future.
Given this significance, it is imperative that the judgements of 
neonatologists incorporate an understanding of the lived realities 
of disability, as reported by disabled people themselves. The social 
world invariably, and often surreptitiously, influences what neona-
tologists consider ‘worthwhile life’ . In turn, their judgements feed 
back into, and directly influence, that same social world. As such, 
neonatologists need to engage in continuous reflexive practice.
This reflexivity may usefully include a consideration of the role 
that personal experience with health and disability plays in framing 
the sorts of health states that neonatologists consider intolerable in 
others, and, ultimately, the decisions they make about treatment with-
drawal or continuation. In addition, they may also benefit from engage-
ment with the disability community, either directly or at the very least 
through the published literature, to explore these concepts. Research 
demonstrates that disabled people consistently rate their quality of 
life higher than the people around them do,10 highlighting the need 
to disentangle clinical definitions of disease severity from the lived 
realities of the condition they are assumed capable of capturing (eg, 
Alex). The findings of these studies clearly demonstrate how critical it 
is to explore the lived experiences of disabled people within their own 
frames of reference. Their stories can provide insights into the way 
that disability and ‘suffering’ are interpreted and experienced within 
a broader social and personal context, factors that increasingly need a 
place within neonatology. Indeed, whilst the introduction of genomic 
medicine to neonatal intensive care may bring new insights to ethically 
complex decisions, it is nevertheless also important to consider the 
gaps that this ever-tighter focus on clinical information opens up, and 
to think creatively about they can be both identified and addressed.
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